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May the bridges we burn light our path forward.

By Michael Starr Hopkins

The election-security story is not a spy movie. It is a county office with old equipment, one tired IT person, a vendor contract nobody can explain, and a federal help line that just got thinner.

Here is the number to hold onto: AP reported that 17 CISA employees who worked with election officials were put on administrative leave in February 2025. Ten were regional election security specialists. AP also reported that CISA ended about $10 million in annual funding to the Center for Internet Security, cutting support for EI-ISAC and MS-ISAC.

That is not paperwork. That is the crew that helps local officials spot cyber threats, share warnings, train staff, and keep panic from becoming the loudest voice in the room.

Source label: Associated Press reporting on CISA staff leave and funding cuts.

Elections are local, but the threat is not. The voting system touches registration databases, ballot design, equipment testing, poll books, websites, email accounts, vendor support, public-result reporting, and the people who have to explain all of it when something looks wrong.

CISA says election security covers both physical security and cybersecurity for the systems and assets that support elections. EAC notes that DHS designated election systems as critical infrastructure. Translation: this is not a side chore. It is part of the national power grid of democracy.

The machine is thin local capacity sitting under national pressure. AP reported more than 8,000 local election jurisdictions across the country. StateScoop reported that smaller local governments may have only a handful of IT workers, and sometimes one employee splits IT with other duties.

Then add the vendor problem. Verified Voting and Penn Wharton found that the top three firms, ES&S, Dominion, and Hart, together made up more than 90 percent of the voting-technology market. If three companies sit that high in the stack, vendor accountability is not a footnote. It is part of election security.

The proof is the sequence. First, the people who knew state and local election offices got pulled onto leave. Then the money for shared cyber and physical security support was cut. Then the same local offices still had to defend registration systems, county websites, email, scanners, ballot software, and public trust.

Cybersecurity Dive reported in June 2025 that CISA had lost roughly 1,000 staffers, down to about 2,200, nearly a one-third cut. That is the federal backdrop behind the local election office trying to get through a high-pressure cycle without becoming tomorrow morning's conspiracy theory.

Source label: Cybersecurity Dive CISA workforce reporting and Verified Voting/Penn Wharton voting-technology market report.

The voter pays when the boring security work gets treated like optional overhead. They pay with longer lines, slower corrections, weaker public information, and more room for bad actors to turn a website outage or scanner problem into a lie about the whole election.

The local clerk pays too. They get the angry calls. They get the threats. They get the budget meeting where everyone wants perfect security for bargain-bin money.

The loudest people in politics say they care about election integrity. Then the actual integrity tools get cut: staff, training, information sharing, threat intelligence, incident response, vulnerability scans, and field relationships with the counties doing the work.

That is the tell. If you only care about election security when it gives you a slogan, you do not want secure elections. You want a microphone.

This fight needs investigators, organizers, lawyers, data people, policy writers, local reporters, and designers who can turn records into pressure.

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